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Subcontracting and vertical integration
in the Spanish cotton industry
1
By JOAN R. ROSÉS
This paper examines changes in the organization of the Spanish cotton industry from
1736 to 1860 in its core region of Catalonia.As the Spanish cotton industry adopted
the most modern technology available and experienced the transition to the factory
system, cotton spinning and weaving mills became increasingly vertically integrated.
Asset speciﬁcity, more than other factors, explains this tendency towards vertical
integration. The probability of a ﬁrm being vertically integrated was higher among
ﬁrms located in districts with high concentration ratios,and rose with size and the use
of modern machinery. At the same time, subcontracting predominated in other
phases of production and distribution, where transaction costs appear to be less
important.
T
he organizational structure of the cotton industry has attracted much schol-
arly attention, as it has been regarded as one of the key factors behind the
international competitiveness of the industry.
2 On the one hand, Lazonick and
others have condemned the reliance of Lancashire on vertically specialized (single-
phase) ﬁrms and its adverse consequences for coordinated investment in new
technologies, transport costs, and decision-making.
3 On the other hand, a number
of authors have been highly sceptical of this interpretation of the advantages of
vertical integration.
4 In particular, it has been shown that the alleged beneﬁts of
vertical integration rarely manifested themselves in terms of superior international
competitiveness or proﬁtability.
5
Differences in the business structures of cotton textile industries around the
world emerged during the nineteenth century. By the 1850s, English and French
cotton ﬁrms were mainly vertically specialized; whereas in the United States,
Germany, and Spain, cotton ﬁrms were mostly vertically structured, combining
spinning and weaving.
6 Even within the same country or region, some ﬁrms
vertically integrated cotton spinning and weaving while others preferred to put
their yarn onto the market and, hence, were specialized. For example, within
Lancashire, vertical integration was more common among cotton mills producing
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the very useful comments and suggestions received from three anony-
mous referees, Mar Rubio, and the participants at the European Business History Association Conference
(Barcelona) and the Global Economic History Network Meeting (Osaka), particularly those of his discussants on
these occasions, Mary B. Rose and Masaki Nakabayashi. The Spanish Ministry of Education (Grants SEC
2002-01595 and SEJ2006-08188/ECON) supported this research.The usual disclaimer applies.
2 A review of the literature is available in Jeremy, ‘Organization’.
3 See Lazonick, ‘Industrial organization’, and Mass and Lazonick, ‘British cotton industry’.
4 Perry (‘Vertical integration’, p. 185) deﬁnes vertical integration as the elimination of trade or contractual
exchanges within the ﬁrm itself.
5 See a review in Leunig, ‘New answers’.
6 On England, see Taylor, ‘Concentration and specialization’; Farnie, English cotton industry; Lyons, ‘Vertical
integration’; Huberman, ‘Vertical disintegration’. On France, see Sicsic, ‘Establishment size’. On the United
States, see Temin, ‘Product quality’. On Germany, see Brown, ‘Market organization’.
1coarse cloth than in those cotton mills specializing in ﬁne goods.
7 Trends across
countries were also unclear: while vertical integration decreased progressively in
England and France, in the United States and Spain it gained momentum over the
course of the nineteenth century.
Within this international panorama, there is a highly interesting phenomenon:
the dramatic transition of the Spanish cotton spinning and weaving industry in
practically two decades (from 1840 to 1860) from a market-based system of
business relations to a system of vertically integrated ﬁrms where intermediate
yarn markets were replaced by internalization. However, at the same time, other
phases of cotton production and trade remained vertically specialized: Barcelona
cotton brokers and merchant-houses organized the supply of raw cotton;
8 cotton-
ﬁnishing ﬁrms were typically vertically specialized; and merchant-houses, agents,
and independent travellers were responsible for the marketing of ﬁnished cloth.
9
This article investigates vertical integration of cotton spinning and weaving
ﬁrms in Spain in the mid-nineteenth century.The evidence indicates that vertical
integration in the mid-nineteenth century was more closely related to the presence
of asset speciﬁcity in intermediate yarn markets than to other factors.
10 In other
markets, like those of raw cotton, and semi-ﬁnished (grey) and ﬁnished cloth,
where asset speciﬁcity problems appear to be less important, vertically disinte-
grated ﬁrms were more common.
Although this article focuses on the Spanish cotton industry, it may have much
broader signiﬁcance, since several of its arguments can serve to qualify the debate
surrounding the role of vertical integration in the development of the cotton
industry. The evidence collected in this article shows that the structure of inter-
mediate markets could account for vertical integration.Consequently,regions with
large markets for intermediate inputs and low concentration ratios, like Lancash-
ire, would not need to have vertically integrated ﬁrms to develop their cotton
industry efﬁciently. On the other hand, for regions where the extent of interme-
diate markets was limited and concentration ratios were high, vertical integration
was the best option. This article also shows the weak relation between vertical
integration and international competitiveness. Despite the preponderance of ver-
tically integrated ﬁrms in cotton spinning and weaving, the Spanish cotton indus-
try had a limited presence in international markets and maintained its domestic
market, thanks to heavy tariff protection.
11
I
As in many European countries, the development of the cotton industry was
central to early industrial development in Spain during the nineteenth century.
This industry was the single largest employer of manufacturing labour. It was also
the ﬁrst to import steam power technology and factory-based production from
7 Huberman, ‘Vertical disintegration’.
8 Castañeda and Tafunell, ‘Mercado mayorista’.
9 Prat and Soler, ‘Formación de redes comerciales’.
10 The concept of asset speciﬁcity refers to the extent to which a particular investment might be used for
alternative purposes.
11 On the lower productivity of the Spanish cotton industry, see Rosés, ‘Competitividad internacional’, for the
mid-nineteenth century, and Clark, ‘Why isn’t the whole world developed?’, for the early twentieth century.
2abroad.
12 Moreover, many cotton textile mills were among the largest Spanish
manufacturing establishments.
13 Although during the early industrialization
period the cotton industry’s rate of growth outstripped all other Spanish indus-
tries, its impact on overall growth rates was relatively limited. By 1860, cotton
textiles’ share in Spanish GDP was only between 1 and 2 per cent.
14
The history of the Spanish cotton industry mainly concerns Catalonia.
15Textiles
were well established in the region and Barcelona had been an important urban
textile centre since the thirteenth century. However, it was during the eighteenth
century, and especially after the 1780s, that cotton textiles became an increasingly
important component of the Catalan economy.
16 The concentration of textile
producers in Catalonia magniﬁed the impact on the regional economy. Because of
the geographic concentration of textile production, Catalonia industrialized more
rapidly than the rest of the country. Moreover, Catalonia was the largest cotton
textile producer in the Mediterranean basin, although this industry was tiny when
compared with the British or New England cotton industries. By the 1850s,
Catalan textile producers wove about one-seventeenth of the cloth woven in
Britain and one-sixth of that produced in New England.
17 It should be noted that
the disparities in the quality of cotton cloth between these countries were as
notable as the differences in amount of production. In general, Catalan cotton
mills produced cloth somewhere between the coarser production of the New
England mills and the ﬁner quality of the Lancashire cotton mills.
18
The early development of cotton textiles in Catalonia was gradual and was
marked as much by continuity as by change. Nevertheless, transformation was not
without its discontinuities, and the cotton industry in Catalonia experienced three
successive phases: 1736–1780s; 1780s–1833; and 1833–61.
The Early Period (1736–1780s)
19
Imitating several of the economic policies of the British and French governments,
measures to encourage manufacturing expansion and economic development were
introduced in Spain by the new Bourbon dynasty.
20 An initial ban on the import
of Asian cotton textiles was implemented in 1717 and was further extended in
1728 to European imitations. However, the legislation allowed the introduction of
foreign cotton yarn.These measures provided an initial motivation for the devel-
opment of cotton textiles in Catalonia; thus a ﬁrst generation of enterprises
dedicated to weaving and printing cotton was established in Barcelona after 1736.
Nascent manufacturers sought to inﬂuence trade policy. Their lobbying had a
12 Nadal, Fracaso, p. 195.
13 The data collected in Giménez Guited, Guia fabril, shows that the cotton industry concentrated more than
60% of labour in manufacturing establishments with 50 or more workers.
14 Rosés, ‘Industrialización regional’, pp. 64–72.
15 According to Gimenez Guited, Guia fabril, p. 209, it produced about 75% of Spanish cotton textiles.
16 In 1860, cotton textiles employed about one-third of the Catalan industrial workforce and about one-tenth
of its total workforce (Rosés, ‘Industrialización regional’).
17 Rosés, ‘Choice of technology’, pp. 136–7.
18 Ibid.
19 There is ample literature on the history of the cotton industry in Catalonia during this period. See recent
reviews in Sánchez, ‘Crisis económica’, and Thompson, ‘Technological transfer’.
20 On these ﬁrst developments, see Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation, pp. 67–72.
3long-standing impact on the measures concerning cotton textiles, and for most of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, cotton textile producers enjoyed strong
protection. Nevertheless, this new industry beneﬁted not only from government
initiatives and protection, but also from the relative abundance of merchants,
artisans, and machine-makers in Barcelona, as well as the fact that textile produc-
tion was an ancient tradition of the region.
The following decades witnessed a considerable growth in cotton printing
production in Barcelona. At the industry’s peak in 1786, this city was the most
important location in Europe for cotton printing, with 113 calico concerns.
21
Catalan calicoes were sold on the protected domestic markets and to Spanish
colonies in America.
22 Simultaneously, there were also important improvements in
the rate of technological innovation. By the mid-eighteenth century, Catalan
manufacturers were pioneers among continental cotton industries in the adoption
of innovations like indigo printing (1746) and engraved copper plates for printing
(1770).
23
The Intermediate Period (1780s–1833)
24
The incorporation of the spinning process into the Catalan cotton industry char-
acterized the second period of its development. As all cotton yarn was imported
(mainly from Malta) for most of the eighteenth century, cotton spinning was of
little importance in Catalonia. For example, the share of cotton yarn produced
locally in 1784 was only 22 per cent, with the remaining 78 per cent being
imported from Malta (43 per cent) and other Mediterranean ports. In 1784, two
French machine-makers arrived in Barcelona, bringing with them the technology
of the spinning jenny.The adoption of the spinning jenny by local manufacturers
was immediate.
25 A few years later, in 1792, an English engineer introduced an
improved Highs jenny of 78 spindles (instead of the common 40 spindles) and a
new card machine.The Arkwright water frame reached Catalonia soon after the
Highs jenny.
26 Over the next few years, local machine-makers were not only able
to produce copies of the original spinning jenny but also developed a large jenny
with more spindles (up to 120), called the ‘bergadana’.
27 By the end of the century
(1796), there were reported to be 250 bergadanas in operation.
28
Successive wars and political disruptions were obstacles to the industry’s
progress during the ﬁrst quarter of the nineteenth century. However, local pro-
duction of cotton yarn and cloth was boosted by the bans on foreign imports of
cotton yarn in 1802 and the introduction of mule-jennies from France in 1806.As
had happened previously with the spinning jenny and the water frame, these
wooden mule-jennies, powered by water wheels or horses, were rapidly copied by
21 Thompson, ‘Technological transfer’.
22 A long-running debate surrounds the role played by the colonial and home markets in the development of
the Catalan cotton industry. On this subject, see the review of the literature in Delgado, ‘Mercado interno’.
23 Thompson, ‘Technological transfer’.
24 On this period, see Sánchez, ‘Era de la manufactura algodonera’; idem, ‘Indianeria catalana’; idem, ‘Crisis
económica’; Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation; idem, ‘Technological transfer’.
25 Sánchez, ‘Crisis económica’, pp. 495–6.
26 Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation, pp. 249–54.
27 Ferrer Vidal, Conferencias, p. 101.
28 Sánchez, ‘Crisis económica’, p. 494.
4local machine-makers.
29 In the following years, three major developments affected
cotton spinning. Several new cotton mills with wooden mule-jennies powered by
horses were established in Barcelona and the seaside district of Maresme. In the
inland district of Bages, which had abundant water resources, water-frame spin-
ning mills ﬂourished.
30 Simultaneously, hand spinning production shifted to areas
in the north of Catalonia, an area with earlier manufacturing traditions and a good
supply of cheap domestic labour.
31 Following the spread of cotton spinning away
from Barcelona, handloom weavers proliferated throughout Catalonia.
32
Unlike cotton spinning and weaving, the cotton printing industry remained
mainly located in Barcelona.
33 Since the 1790s, calico concerns had experienced
severe problems of overproduction, caused by the successive wars with England
and France. In addition to these difﬁculties, the industry was also suffering from
a structural crisis. Several forces were now working against centralized manufac-
ture, which had predominated during the previous period.The large calico con-
cerns gradually abandoned the production of yarn and cloth and concentrated on
printing.Moreover,many of them disappeared during these years of turmoil,while
new small-scale producers gained importance.
34 Probably as a consequence of the
combination of wartime and structural crises, the technological progress of the
industry was extremely slow and few establishments adopted the new British and
French machinery.
35
The Revolutionary Period (1833–1861)
36
The three decades preceding the ‘cotton famine’ witnessed dramatic changes,
which affected all aspects of cotton production in Catalonia simultaneously.The
rate of technological change accelerated dramatically with the arrival of new
machinery from England.The average quality of local production also improved
signiﬁcantly. Finally, inland locations of the industry struggled, while coastal sites
gained importance.
The ﬁrst steam-powered mill appeared in 1833 when the company Bonaplata,
Vilaregut, Rull & Cía. began to produce cloth made on power looms in Barcelona.
Throughout the 1830s, steam power spread slowly in the Catalan cotton industry.
In 1841, steam was clearly the least important source of power: of 2,014
horsepower (HP) employed in the Catalan mills in that year, only 289 HP, or
14 per cent, was obtained from steam.
37 The pace of technological change accel-
erated in the 1840s with the end of the CivilWar in 1840 and the removal of British
restrictions on machinery exports. By 1850, the total HP employed in the industry
29 Sánchez, ‘Era de la manufactura algodonera’, p. 83; Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation, pp. 263–4.
30 Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation, p. 261.
31 Gutiérrez,Impugnación;Sánchez,‘Era de la manufactura algodonera’;Thompson,Distinctive industrialisation;
García Balañà, Fabricació de la fàbrica.
32 Sánchez, ‘Era de la manufactura algodonera’; García Balañà, Fabricació de la fàbrica.
33 Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation.
34 Thompson (Distinctive industrialisation, pp. 268–301) offers a detailed account of the crisis of the large calico
printing concerns.
35 On the mechanization of calico printing, see Nadal andTafunell, Sant Martí de Provençals, and Thompson,
‘Technological transfer’.
36 See a review of the literature on this period in Nadal, ‘Indústria cotonera’.
37 Sayró, Industria algodonera, and Madoz, Diccionario, vol. III, pp. 459–78.
5had increased to 3,755 and the proportion attributable to steam had soared to
about 60 per cent.
38 Eleven years later (1861), the total HP employed in the
industry had increased to 5,800 and the proportion attributable to steam had risen
to 67 per cent.
39
In Catalonia, technological progress in cotton spinning went hand in hand with
the spread of steam power.Thus, from 1841 to 1850, the number of hand-spindles
declined dramatically from 725,787 to 180,058, whereas the number of mechani-
cal spindles grew from 316,320 to 524,178.
40 Simultaneously, new iron mule-
jennies and throstles replaced the old wooden mule-jennies and water frames. By
1861, the demise of hand spinning was complete, since practically all cotton yarn
was produced with modern steam- or water-powered machinery.
41 Moreover, new
self-acting mules displaced mule-jennies from factories.
Technological change was slower in weaving than in spinning.The persistence of
handloom weaving can be explained partly by technological reasons.Although the
ﬁrst proﬁtable power-looms dated back to 1813, they were best suited to weaving
coarse cloth. In the 1840s and 1850s, the adoption of high-pressure steam engines
and the subsequent decrease in power costs extended the range of cloth types that
could be produced efﬁciently with power-looms.
42 This signiﬁed the progressive
retreat of handloom weaving, which survived in the fancy segments of the market.
It is also important to note that power-looms required high-strength yarn which
was more economically produced with throstles or self-acting mules. In Catalonia,
the ﬁrst power-looms were introduced in 1828.
43 In 1841, however, the balance
between handlooms and power-looms was still clearly favourable to hand machin-
ery.
44 In effect, for each power-loom in use, there were more than 100 handlooms.
Ten years later (1850), the number of power-looms had increased 25-fold, while
the number of handlooms remained roughly the same.
45The demise of handloom
weaving was apparent in 1861; by this time, the number of handlooms had halved
in comparison to 1850 ﬁgures, while the number of power-looms had multiplied
by 1.7.
46 Of the total cotton cloth woven in that year in Catalonia, only about
one-ﬁfth was made by hand-weavers.
47
Technological advances also modiﬁed cotton-ﬁnishing processes drastically. In
printing, manual processes using wooden blocks and copper plates were being
replaced by engraved copper rollers by the mid-1780s. This new machinery
dramatically increased the speed of printing and labour productivity. However, as
was the case with weaving, block prints still had to be used in ﬁnishing patterns on
ﬁne goods after cylinders had printed most of the design. In Catalonia, techno-
38 Arxiu del Foment del Treball de Catalunya (hereafter AFTC), Barcelona, fons Junta de Fábricas de
Cataluña, Censo de fabricas de 1850.
39 Comisión Especial Arancelaria, Información, vol. IV, pp. 38, 57.
40 The ﬁrst ﬁgure is from Sayró, Industria algodonera, and the second from Junta de Fábricas de Cataluña, Censo
de fabricas de 1850, Arxiu del Foment del Treball Nacional, Barcelona.
41 Giménez Guited, Guia fabril.
42 See von Tunzelmann, Steam power, ch. 7. In contrast, Farnie, English cotton industry, pp. 277, 281–2, and
Lyons, ‘Powerloom proﬁtability’, pp. 398–400, stress the importance of the development of the Blackburn plain
loom in 1841.
43 Ferrer Vidal, Conferencias.
44 Sayró, Industria algodonera; Madoz, Diccionario, vol. III, pp. 459–78.
45 AFTC, fons Junta de Fábricas de Cataluña, Censo de fabricas de 1850.
46 Giménez Guited, Guía fabril, p. 209.
47 See app.
6logical progress was exceptionally rapid in cotton printing during the 1840s and
1850s. In 1835, only four cylinder printing machines had been installed in Cata-
lonia, but by 1850 the number of active machines had soared to 41, reaching 65
in 1861. The spread of the perrotine was even more impressive. This machine
arrived from France only six years after its invention in 1840, and by 1861 there
were 43 in use.
48
Until the 1830s, Catalan cotton textile production was concentrated in the low
grades of yarn (below 20 count) due to the unskilled workforce and the use of
jennies and water frames. The spread of new machinery during the 1840s and
1850s went hand in hand with an increase in the quality of local production, since
the average count increased to 30 count from about 15 count. More speciﬁcally, in
the late 1850s, more than three-quarters of its production was in medium counts
(20–40 count).At the same time, production of the ﬁnest quality was minimal (on
average, less than the 2 per cent of the total in the 1850s).
49
It should be noted that further changes in the location of the industry occurred
during this period, as a consequence of the spread of steam power among cotton
industrialists. More speciﬁcally, coastal locations, particularly Barcelona, gained in
importance, while inland locations—even those well endowed with water—lost a
signiﬁcant part of their importance.
50 In spite of these changes, cotton production
remained relatively well distributed through Catalonia in comparison to Lancash-
ire. For example, the distance between Barcelona and the capital of the second
most important cotton district, Igualada (Anoia), was about 40 miles by road.
More signiﬁcantly, the most important location of cotton spinning and weaving in
Catalonia, Barcelona, only accounted for about 40 per cent of total production
(table 1, ﬁgure 1).
II
The eighteenth-century calico printing industry was based on medium-large and
centralized production units, although several managerial structures, from capi-
talistic ﬁrms to artisans’ shops, were to be found.The typical unit of production
consisted of several work-teams with several masters, artisans, apprentices, and
labourers.
51 It was also integrated backward into cotton weaving and forward into
marketing.The forward integration into marketing of calico producers was facili-
tated by the fact that many partners of the calico printing concerns were mer-
chants.To distribute their products outside Catalonia, manufacturers organized a
network of agents who were in charge of looking for buyers and received the fabrics
on credit. For this reason, a considerable part of the capital of the calico concerns
was commonly devoted to ﬁnancing these marketing networks. However,
48 Nadal, ‘Indústria cotonera’, pp. 34–7; Nadal and Tafunell, Sant Martí de Provençals, pp. 39–50.
49 This paragraph draws heavily on Rosés, ‘Choice of technology’, pp. 138–9.
50 This trend was partly reversed after the ‘cotton famine’, when new water mills proliferated on the banks of
the rivers Ter and Llobregat (Nadal, ‘Indústria cotonera’, pp. 48–64). This reversal of the normal dialectic of
progression from water to steam was an exceptional characteristic of the Catalan cotton industry.
51 Grau and López, ‘Empresari’; Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation; Sánchez, ‘Era de la manufactura
algodonera’.
7particularly in overseas trade, cotton concerns sometimes employed alternative
channels of distribution, such as cloth wholesalers, independent travellers, and
specialized merchant-houses.
52
A movement towards specialization began in the early 1790s, with the spread of
cotton spinning and weaving away from Barcelona.
53The precise relation between
the interrelated sources of entrepreneurship and capital and the product strategies
and the scale of ﬁrms during this period is difﬁcult to determine.
54 It was clear,
however,that a complex interaction between different cotton textile producers and
merchants was replicated throughout Catalonia. For example, the medium-sized
textile producers frequently rented space, and sometimes power, to the largest
producers.Although business organization was very far from impersonal atomistic
competition, there was no question of a single producer or group exerting over-
whelming dominance.
To be more precise,in the hand-spinning districts of the north of Catalonia,yarn
production was organized as in the typical cottage industry, but also in artisans’
shops.
55 In a cottage industry, the subcontractor provided raw materials and
52 Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation, pp. 87–8.
53 Sánchez, ‘Era de la manufactura algodonera’, pp. 93–9.
54 Recent detailed accounts of the cotton industry structure are available in Solà Parera, Aigua; García Balañá,
Fabricació de la fàbrica; and Ferrer Alós, ‘Bergadanas’. It is interesting to note the close parallels with Lancashire
during the period. See Rose, Firms, pp. 58–98, on the situation in Lancashire.
55 See Ferrer Alós, ‘Bergadanas’, p. 345.
Table 1. The share (%) of the different districts in
cotton textiles production, 1850 and 1861
Districts
Spinning Weaving
1850 1861 1850 1861
Anoia 15.41 10.20 5.98 5.66
Bages 10.78 13.79 9.63 11.36
Barcelona 43.48 34.81 38.69 42.84
Garraf 3.34 7.59 4.07 9.57
Girona 2.76 2.71 4.27 2.91
Maresme 8.47 7.44 12.93 11.66
North 8.19 11.56 5.89 4.84
South 4.87 8.46 12.89 3.54
Vallès 2.70 3.43 5.66 7.62
Notes: The share of each district is computed as the ratio between the estimated
production in tons of yarn or cloth per year of a given district and the total
estimated production in tons of yarn or cloth per year of Catalonia.The actual
counties (comarques) of Alt Penedés, Anoia, Baix Llobregat, and Conca de
Barberà formed the cotton district of Anoia; the county of Bages formed the
cotton district of Bages; the county of Barcelonés formed the cotton district of
Barcelona; the county of Garraf formed the cotton district of Garraf; the coun-
ties of Gironés, la Selva, Garrotxa, and Pla de l’Estany formed the cotton district
of Girona; the county of Maresme formed the district of Maresme; the counties
of Cerdanya, Solsonés, Berguedà, and Osona formed the North cotton district;
the counties of Alt Camp, Baix Camp, andTarragones formed the South cotton
district; and, ﬁnally, the counties ofVallès Occidental andVallès Oriental formed
the cotton district of Vallès.
Sources: For 1850: Junta de Fabricas de Cataluña, Censo de fábricas de 1850,
Arxiu del Foment del Treball Nacional, Barcelona. For 1861: Giménez Guited,
Guia fabril, pp. 24–65, 90–8, 111–12, 152–68. For an estimation of production
and coverage of the sample, see app.
8semi-ﬁnished goods to a producer (usually female) who used their own tools and
also played, at least to some extent, a supervisory role with regard to the ﬁnal
product. In small artisans’ shops, mainly located in Berga, men and women
worked together.Women were involved in yarn production, while men took care of
cloth production and controlled the overall process; there was, therefore, a certain
vertical integration between cotton spinning and weaving.
Handloom weaving in districts like Anoia, Osona, and Bagés provides a model
example of independent artisan production. In handloom weaving workshops,
several artisans, with a few assistants, who were sometimes young members of the
family, ran a small production unit with limited division of labour. In contrast,
handloom putting-out networks predominated in other districts.The organization
of these domestic networks was very similar to that of cotton spinning. Conse-
quently, although domestic producers used their own looms, the sub-contractor
provided yarn and played a supervisory role with regard to the ﬁnal product.
56
56 Ibid.
Figure 1. The cotton districts of Catalonia, c.1850
Notes: See tab. 1.
Source: Author’s elaboration.
9During the same period, the new cotton spinning mills in Barcelona and the
districts of Maresme and Bages became specialized and did not integrate forward
into cotton weaving. Similarly, printing concerns, mainly located in Barcelona,
abandoned backward integration into cotton weaving and, hence, used the cloth
made by independent handloom weavers.Therefore, spinning mills and printing
concerns frequently relied on external contracts with independent handloom
weavers.
The technological advances of the 1840s and 1850s were accompanied by the
proliferation of two different types of mills, although other types of business
organizations (like workshops and putting-out networks) survived. In coastal loca-
tions the town mills predominated, whereas river mills held the upper hand in
inland locations.
57The typical town cotton mill used steam power and self-acting
mules (and sometimes power-looms), and produced yarn and/or cloth of medium
quality.The typical river mill, on the other hand, was water-driven and employed
throstles and self-acting mules (and also sometimes power-looms) to produce
coarse yarn and heavy cloth. These different patterns of specialization were the
result of two major factors: the cost structure of the different types of yarn and
cloth and the characteristics of the labour force.
58 River mills saved on coal but
were more capital-intensive, while town mills saved on capital but were more
labour-intensive. Furthermore, town mills tended to employ more skilled labour
than river mills, whose workforce consisted mainly of young women.This led to
two types of shop-ﬂoor organization: teams and internal subcontracting predomi-
nated in town mills, whereas foremanship practices were much more common in
river mills.
Other dramatic changes affected the organization of the cotton industry in
Catalonia during the 1840s and 1850s.Vertical integration of cotton spinning and
weaving was not common before the 1840s, but increased dramatically in the
following years (see table 2).
59 According to the industrial survey for 1850, vertical
integration was quite widespread in the ﬁeld of cotton spinning: 229 ﬁrms with
9,389 spinners operated exclusively in cotton spinning, and 85 ﬁrms with 4,235
spinners had integrated vertically into cotton spinning and weaving.
60These ﬁrms
also employed about half of the power installed and more than one-third of the
mechanical spindles. Particularly relevant was their share of self-acting mules,
since they employed 68 per cent of the total of this modern spinning machinery.
In cotton weaving, the share of vertically integrated ﬁrms was smaller than in
cotton spinning, due to the abundance of very small ﬁrms, all hand-powered, in
this industry. However, as in cotton spinning, vertically integrated ﬁrms used the
most modern machinery. For example, more than 83 per cent of power-looms
were installed in vertically integrated ﬁrms. For that reason, more than 40 per cent
of cloth production was in the hands of these ﬁrms, even though they employed
only 15 per cent of weavers.
57 Steam-powered cotton mills predominated in the districts of Barcelona, Garraf, Maresme, South, andVallés,
whereas water-driven cotton mills were common in the districts of Anoia, Bages, Girona, and North.
58 The cost structure of different cotton products according to quality in Catalonia is available in Rosés,‘Choice
of technology’, pp. 150–3.
59The ﬁrst vertically integrated cotton spinning and weaving ﬁrms had appeared in the last years of the
eighteenth century. See Sánchez, ‘Era de la manufactura algodonera’.
60 See app. for sources.
10In the 1850s, vertically integrated cotton mills continued their expansion, cap-
turing the market for medium-coarse cloth. However, well before the 1860s, some
horizontal spinning mills and domestic hand-weavers survived by producing for
more fashion-oriented segments of the market.
61 By 1861, vertically integrated
ﬁrms employed more than 60 per cent of spindles and more than 80 per cent of
power-looms, and produced 67 per cent of cotton cloth.
62 Moreover, in 11 years,
the number of vertically integrated ﬁrms had increased by 25 per cent, while the
number of specialized ﬁrms decreased by about 35 per cent in cotton spinning and
more than halved in weaving.
In comparison with England and France, vertical integration was much more
important in Catalonia.
63 English vertically integrated cotton mills employed
52.9 per cent of workers, 63.9 per cent of power-looms, and 41.8 per cent of
mechanical spindles in 1861.
64 French vertically integrated cotton mills employed
only 3 per cent of the cotton textiles workforce.
65 In sharp contrast, Catalonian
vertically integrated mills employed 65.8 per cent of workers, 80.2 per cent of
power-looms, and 55.2 per cent of spindles.
The integration of cotton spinning and weaving with cotton printing was a
comparative rarity.In 1850,only four of 57 printing ﬁrms also vertically integrated
cotton weaving. These vertically integrated ﬁrms employed 9 per cent of the
workers and 14 per cent of the steam power used in the cotton printing industry.
66
As with the integration of cotton spinning and weaving, integration into cotton
printing progressed during the 1850s, although it remained relatively scarce
in comparison with cotton spinning and weaving. By 1861, seven of 41 ﬁrms
61 Comisión Especial Arancelaria, Información.
62 Gimenez Guited, Guia fabril. For estimation of production, see app.
63 To compare Catalonia and England correctly, it is necessary to convert the Catalan data to the British
standards. The British sources do not report all labour because, for example, handloom weavers were not
included. For this reason, only steam-powered and water-driven factories with more than 10 workers were
considered. Gatrell, ‘Labour’, offers a detailed description of British sources.
64 Farnie, English cotton industry, p. 317.
65 Sicsic, ‘Establishment size’, p. 459.
66 AFTC, fons Junta de Fábricas de Cataluña, C e n s od ef a b r i c a sd e1 8 5 0 .
Table 2. The diffusion of vertical integration in cotton spinning and weaving, 1850
and 1861
1850 1861
Firms % Production % Firms % Production %
Panel A: spinning
Specialized 229 72.93 7,654 63.99 149 58.20 6,740 39.06
Integrated 85 27.07 4,308 36.01 107 41.80 10,518 60.94
Total 314 100.00 11,962 100.00 256 100.00 17,258 100.00
Panel B: weaving
Specialized 891 91.29 5,779 55.69 411 79.34 5,039 33.01
Integrated 85 8.71 4,598 44.31 107 20.66 10,225 66.99
Total 976 100.00 10,377 100.00 518 100.00 15,264 100.00
Notes: Some rounding of numbers. Firms with fewer than 10 workers have been excluded from the table. Production is expressed
in tons of yarn (spinning panel) and cloth (weaving panel). Specialized spinning ﬁrms are spinning ﬁrms without a weaving
section. Specialized weaving ﬁrms are weaving ﬁrms without a spinning section. Integrated ﬁrms are ﬁrms with both spinning and
weaving sections.
Sources: See tab. 1.
11integrated the two consecutive phases and employed about 24 per cent of
modern printing cylinders, but a lower proportion of the old machinery.
67
Vertically integrated ﬁrms predominated among the largest ﬁrms in both cotton
spinning and weaving (see table 3). In cotton spinning in 1850, only one-third of
the smallest ﬁrms (producing less of 50 tons of yarn per year) were integrated
vertically, whereas this proportion grew to 62 per cent in the case of the largest
ﬁrms (producing more than 100 tons of yarn per year). Similarly, in cotton
weaving in 1850, only 6 per cent of the ﬁrms producing less than 50 tons of cloth
per year were vertically integrated, whereas the ﬁgure grew to 86 per cent for ﬁrms
producing more than 100 tons of cloth per year.
In the 11 years from 1850 to 1861, the size of the average cotton spinning and
weaving ﬁrm grew considerably. In cotton spinning, average production per ﬁrm
rose from 38 tons of yarn per year in 1850 to 67 tons of yarn per year in 1861.
Similarly, in cotton weaving, average production per ﬁrm went up from 10.6 tons
of cloth per year in 1850 to 29 tons of cloth per year in 1861. This growth in
average production was mainly due to the increasing share of the largest ﬁrms in
total production. However, the share of vertically integrated ﬁrms among the
largest ﬁrms decreased slightly. Therefore, the number of very large vertically
integrated ﬁrms grew mainly because the number of large ﬁrms also increased.
Previous accounts of the cotton industry tend to stress that specialized and
integrated ﬁrms differed in both type of products and degree of specialization.
Vertically integrated ﬁrms in England and the United States tend to produce
coarser cloth, and hence coarser yarn, than specialized ﬁrms.
68 On the other hand,
specialized English spinners typically focused their production on a narrow range
of counts, while specialized weavers also concentrated in a relatively narrow range
67 Giménez Guited, Guia fabril.
68 Temin, ‘Product quality’.
Table 3. The size distribution of cotton spinning and weaving ﬁrms, 1850 and 1861
Firm size















Specialized Firms 173 48 8 882 7 2
Production 3,399 3,155 1,100 4,943 444 392
Integrated Firms 56 16 13 59 14 12
Production 876 1,140 2,292 493 1,041 3,064
Total Firms 229 64 21 941 21 14
Production 4,274 4,295 3,392 5,436 1,485 3,456
Panel B: 1861
Specialized Firms 103 40 6 393 8 10
Production 2,640 3,113 987 3,028 582 1,429
Integrated Firms 50 28 29 56 18 33
Production 1,266 2,276 6,976 803 1,302 8,120
Total Firms 153 68 35 449 26 43
Production 3,907 5,389 7,963 3,831 1,884 9,550
Notes and sources: See tab. 1.
12of cloths. By contrast, English integrated ﬁrms producing for the domestic market
tended to produce a wide variety of products.
69
As table 4 shows, vertically integrated ﬁrms in Catalonia, regardless of whether
they vertically integrated spinning and weaving or all three phases (spinning,
weaving, and printing), tended to produce medium-coarse cloth. Specialized
weaving ﬁrms, however, tended to produce ﬁne and fancy cloth. Finally, cotton-
ﬁnishing ﬁrms produced all types of cotton goods, since cloth quality depended on
the weaving ﬁrms. Commonly, these cotton printing ﬁrms elaborated a reduced
range of products and were sometimes subcontracted by cotton weaving ﬁrms.
As in Britain, vertically integrated cotton ﬁrms in Catalonia tended to produce
a wider variety of products than specialized ﬁrms.
71Thus, weaving ﬁrms produced
on average 1.4 different cloths (standard deviation of 0.79), printing ﬁrms an
average of 1.8 different fabrics (standard deviation of 1.05), and vertically inte-
grated ﬁrms an average of 3.5 different fabrics (standard deviation of 2.44).
However, vertically integrated ﬁrms (larger than specialized ﬁrms) produced on
average a larger quantity of each type of cloth than specialized ﬁrms.
72The series
of cloth produced by specialized ﬁrms weighed on average 24 tons (standard
deviation of 19) whereas these series in integrated ﬁrms weighed an average of
109.5 tons (standard deviation of 40). Consequently, vertically integrated ﬁrms
produced their standardized products (coarser cloth) on a larger scale than the
specialized ﬁrms which produced ﬁner and fancy cloths. Fine and fancy cloths
were produced in small batches (to order), and required a shorter series than the
coarser fabrics.
73
There were remarkable differences in the distribution of vertically integrated
ﬁrms across cotton districts in Catalonia (see table 5), although this model of
69 Brown, ‘Market organization’.
70 This book collects data on cotton ﬁrms which showed their products in an exhibition to honour the Queen
during her visit to Barcelona. The sample consisted of 54 ﬁrms (17 weaving ﬁrms, 14 printing ﬁrms, and 23
vertically integrated ﬁrms).
71 Nadal (‘Indústria cotonera’, pp. 65–8) attributed this option to the small size of the Spanish home market.
72 The average number of tons of cloth of each different series is obtained by dividing the total amount of cloth
produced per ﬁrm in 1861 by the number of different cloths shown in the exhibition.
73 The home market for high-quality cotton goods was relatively small, due to the relatively lower Spanish
income and its unequal distribution (Prados de la Escosura, ‘Producción y consumo’, pp. 465–7). Moreover,
Spanish ﬁrms were not competitive in international markets and foreign products (mainly from Britain and
France) dominated a large part of this market (Rosés, ‘Competitividad internacional’). Consequently, Spanish
ﬁrms producing the ﬁnest goods were small.






Fine and fancy cloth
(counts 60+)
Weaving 2 2 14
Printing 2 12 6
Spinning and weaving 4 10 0
Spinning, weaving, and printing 2 9 1
Notes: Some ﬁrms produced more than one quality of cloth. Coarse cloth: Curados, Cutíes, Driles, Empesas, and Percalinas
bastas. Medium cloth: Brillantinas, Elefantes, Empesas ﬁnas, Guineas, Hamburgos, Indianas normales, Madepolan, Muselinas,
Panas, Percalinas, Retores, Ruanesas, and Semi-retores. Fine cotton cloth and mixed fabrics: Batistas, Castores, Chalecos,
Florentinas, Guatas, Indianas ﬁnas, Pañuelos, and Piqués.
Sources: The source of data on production is Orellana, Exposición;70 the classiﬁcation of the quality of products is based on
Ronquillo, Diccionario; and the classiﬁcation of ﬁrms is based on Gimenez Guited, Guia fabril, pp. 24–65, 90–8, 111–12, 152–68.
13business organization progressed rapidly between 1850 and 1861 in all districts
(the only exception to this general rule was cotton spinning in the North district).
However,there was no discernible pattern of vertical integration for river and town
cotton mills.Thus, vertical integration predominated in certain districts with town
mills, such as Garraf, while it was relatively scarce in others, like Maresme and
Vallés. Similarly, vertical integration was dominant in districts with many river
mills, such as Bages, but was less important in others, like the North.
74 Moreover,
the existence of vertical integration cannot be linked to the predominance of
foremanship practices on the shop ﬂoor. For example, the largest Catalan cotton
ﬁrm, the España Industrial, located in Barcelona, was vertically integrated and
organized its workforce into work teams.
III
As the extensive literature makes clear, vertical integration is a complex phenom-
enon resulting from many causes which may act alone or interact. Moreover, as
Joskow has recently noted, ‘there is not and will never be one uniﬁed theory of
vertical integration’.
75 However, the transaction cost theory of the ﬁrm is the most
widely employed framework for the study of these institutional arrangements.
76
Coase was the ﬁrst to argue that ﬁrms integrate to avoid the costs of market
exchange.
77 Modern transaction cost theory holds that these costs will be higher
the fewer the number of parties in the market and the more specialized the assets
involved in the transaction, known as asset speciﬁcity. When exchange implies
74 Therefore there was no close connection between the predominance of foremanship practices and vertical
integration, since many town mills, where work teams were more important, were also vertically integrated.
75 Joskow, ‘Vertical integration’, p. 320.
76 Two alternative frameworks are used for the analysis of vertical integration: the neoclassical theories of
vertical integration and the property rights approach. A good review of the different approaches can be found in
Joskow, ‘Vertical integration’. See also Shelanski and Klein, ‘Empirical research’, and Klein, ‘Make-or-buy
decision’, for the empirical literature.
77 Coase, ‘Nature’.
Table 5. District shares (%) of vertically integrated
ﬁrms, 1850 and 1861
Districts
Spinning Weaving
1850 1861 1850 1861
Anoia 11.23 56.09 28.70 67.01
Bages 47.34 56.55 69.93 76.09
Barcelona 31.81 66.40 40.84 62.56
Garraf 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.78
Girona 38.97 48.71 59.93 71.51
Maresme 20.76 76.59 13.79 41.03
North 35.67 26.49 13.77 57.80
South 52.76 60.20 35.45 71.69
Vallès 16.16 27.86 2.21 27.76
Notes: The share of vertically integrated ﬁrms is computed as the ratio between
the estimated production in tons of yarn or cloth per year of vertically integrated
ﬁrms and the estimated production in tons of yarn or cloth per year of a given
district.
Sources: See tab. 1.
14sizeable investments in relationship-speciﬁc capital, an exchange relationship
depending on repeat bargaining is unattractive. Investment in such assets exposes
agents to a potential hazard, since the lack of alternative uses raises the scope for
opportunistic behaviour between contracting parties. If conditions vary, trading
partners may try to expropriate the rents accruing to the speciﬁc assets.This is the
so-called ‘hold-up’ problem.
78 Rents can be protected by means of vertical inte-
gration, where a merger eliminates any adversary interests, or by the use of
contractual safeguards, such as formalized long-term contracts and reputation.
79
As a rule, non-speciﬁc investment will result in market governance (subcontract-
ing),while speciﬁc or idiosyncratic investment and recurrent transacting will result
in ﬁrm governance (vertical integration). All in all, when a ﬁrm invests in assets
with a high degree of asset speciﬁcity, it tends to integrate into the next phase in
order to avoid opportunism in its transactions with other ﬁrms.Williamson iden-
tiﬁes up to ﬁve different situations in which asset speciﬁcity is thought to arise:
physical asset speciﬁcity, dedicated assets, site speciﬁcity, human asset speciﬁcity,
and intangible assets. The ﬁrst three are the most pertinent in the study of the
vertical integration of cotton spinning and weaving.
80
To analyse the issue of the determinants of the decision to vertically integrate
cotton spinning and weaving, this section follows the standard empirical strategy
of transaction cost literature.
81Vertical integration is seen as a function of a certain
asset speciﬁcity property of the underlying transaction. Given that asset speciﬁci-
ties (or transaction costs) are not directly observable (and difﬁcult to measure),
several of the typical proxies for asset speciﬁcity, such as market concentration,
production capacity, and type of technology, are used.
Two alternative deﬁnitions of the dependent variable, vertical integration of
cotton spinning and weaving production, are employed in this article, although the
same set of independent variables is considered to explain them. The ﬁrst treats
vertical integration as a dummy variable, where a cotton ﬁrm is vertically inte-
grated if it is in possession of machinery for both phases of production.The second
approach treats vertical integration as a limited dependent variable, measured by
the ratio of cloth production capacity to yarn production capacity in the case of
cotton spinning and the inverse in the case of cotton weaving. A ratio of one is
assumed to indicate self-sufﬁciency. In the case of cotton spinning, a ratio of less
than one suggests market transaction to sell excess yarn (for example, if the value
is zero, this indicates that the ﬁrm put all its yarn into market transactions).
Similarly, in the case of cotton weaving, a ratio of less than one suggests market
transactions to supplement the production of cloth.
Market concentration serves as a proxy for the potential of a small-numbers
bargaining problem, since it suggests the amount of alternative suppliers (or
buyers) that ﬁrms may turn to in the event of opportunistic behaviour by another
78 Williamson, Markets; idem, Economic institutions; idem, Mechanisms of governance; Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian , ‘Vertical integration’; Grossman and Hart, ‘Costs’.
79 In the case of the early Spanish cotton industry,reputation matters little,since ﬁrms were commonly new and
the survival rate was very low. Similarly, contracts were difﬁcult to enforce because of Spanish law and the
changing political situation.
80 Williamson, Mechanisms of governance, p. 105.
81 See Klein, ‘Make-or-buy decision’, for a detailed analysis of the strategies for empirical research in trans-
action cost economics.
15party.
82 Thus, high concentration could be associated with situations where there
is greater possibility of hold-up problems and a greater incentive to integrate
vertically. In the case of high concentration ratios, dedicated assets and site
speciﬁcity problems may appear. Dedicated assets problems arise when a supplier
makes an investment that would not otherwise be made but for the expectation of
selling a substantial amount to a particular buyer(s).If that relationship terminated
suddenly, it would leave the supplier with signiﬁcant excess of capacity.There is
also a ‘buyer’ side analogy to the dedicated asset history as well.
83 A buyer who
relies on a single (or few) supplier(s) for a large volume of an input may ﬁnd it
difﬁcult and costly to replace these supplies immediately if they are terminated
prematurely. Consequently, it would be very risky to set up a cotton-spinning ﬁrm
in a certain location if the ﬁrm had not found enough demand, and different
buyers, for the quantity of yarn of a certain count (quality) that it was able to put
onto the market. For this reason, it could be interesting for ﬁrms setting up in
certain locations with few buyers of their yarn to integrate into the next phase
instead of growing horizontally by acquiring more ﬁrms in the same phase. An
analogous problem, but on the buyer side, arises with cotton weaving ﬁrms. If a
cotton weaving ﬁrm enters a particular market with a small number of yarn
producers, it could suffer from hold-up problems with its suppliers. On the other
hand, site speciﬁcity arises when successive stages are located in close proximity to
one another, reﬂecting previous decisions to minimize inventory and transport
expenses.The Catalan cotton industry was relatively spread out over many districts
(see table 5). More signiﬁcantly, many mills were water-powered and were located
in the countryside, relatively isolated from suppliers and/or buyers. Even many
steam-powered mills were located in districts where the number of alternative
suppliers and/or buyers was relatively small. Consequently, given that reallocation
costs were high, it is likely that mills in districts with high concentration ratios
tended to integrate vertically cotton spinning and weaving.
The decision to integrate and the extent of vertical integration are hypoth-
esized to be a positive function of ﬁrm size, because the transaction-cost savings
would be greater in larger ﬁrms compared to smaller ﬁrms (all else being equal).
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, larger ﬁrms suffer more dedicated asset
problems than smaller ﬁrms, because the costs of a supply (demand) disruption
would be greater than for smaller ﬁrms.
84 Secondly, if the frequency of transac-
tion rises with ﬁrm size, a higher frequency of transactions will increase the gains
arising from integration and may justify the costs of internal organization.
85
82 Ohanian (‘Vertical integration’) suggests this test for transaction cost theory. It should be noted, however,
that the high market concentration indicator is also consistent with monopoly (monopsody) power explanations
for vertical integration. Moreover, transaction-cost- and market-power-based theories of vertical integration are
difﬁcult to distinguish empirically, since each makes similar predictions (see MacDonald, ‘Market exchange’).
However, the objective of this paper is not to test the superiority of one theory over the other, but to present an
explanation for vertical integration in the cotton industry. It is clear from the results that high buyer and seller
concentration ratios were closely related with vertical integration. Therefore, I do not reject an alternative
interpretation based on market power,although it seems less plausible within the Spanish historical context,given
the behaviour of prices in cotton yarn, grey cloth, and printed cloth.
83 Joskow, ‘Contract duration’.
84 Temin (‘Product quality’, p. 902) raises a similar point.
85 In contrast,other authors hypothesize a negative relation between ﬁrm size and the probability of integration,
due to managerial diseconomies of scale. For a full discussion of the managerial problems and advantages of
vertical integration, see Williamson, Economic institutions, ch. 6.
16Thirdly, the presence of imperfections in capital markets can provide larger ﬁrms
with an incentive for vertical integration.Vertical integration works as an internal
capital market and, therefore, it represents the elimination of ﬁnancial interme-
diaries.
86 In other words, the absence of external ﬁnancing can provide an incen-
tive for ﬁrms to buy the next phase and to employ the money invested in
circulating capital (that is, the money used for credit to customers) within the
ﬁrm. In Spain, the small size of the market and its unstable character caused
difﬁculties for ﬁnancial institutions trying to develop an impersonal system of
money lending.
87 Thus, Catalan cotton ﬁrms used an important part of their
resources to ﬁnance their own customers, since loans from banks and other
ﬁnancial intermediaries were scarce. It was not common for wholesalers or shops
to pay in advance or amortize their debts over short periods. Similarly, small
ﬁrms could not easily borrow money or discount bills of exchange in banks. For
this reason, it was common for larger ﬁrms to ﬁnance smaller industrial ﬁrms.
Consequently, for large cotton ﬁrms, it may have been a good idea to integrate
backward (or forward), because they had already indirectly ﬁnanced this phase,
and to convert the circulating capital lent to other companies into ﬁxed capital
which was directly owned by the company.
Finally, a positive relation between modern machinery and vertical integration
is hypothesized. Physical assets and dedicated assets speciﬁcity can account for
this situation. Physical asset speciﬁcity problems arise when ﬁrms make invest-
ments in equipment and machinery with design characteristics speciﬁc to the
transaction and, hence, lower values in alternative uses. Several technical char-
acteristics of the machinery available in the cotton industry during the second
third of the nineteenth century could generate this kind of problem. Firstly, the
self-acting mule in cotton spinning and the power-loom in cotton weaving were
only suitable for medium and coarse qualities. Secondly, as previously seen, they
produced longer series than other types of machinery; consequently, they also
incurred dedicated assets problems.The old technologies, mule-jennies and han-
dlooms, were more efﬁcient in the elaboration of ﬁne cloth and mixed fabrics
and could produce in small batches (to order).
88 Thirdly, power-looms required
very homogeneous high-strength yarn to avoid recurrent breakouts during the
weaving process. Only self-acting mules and throstles were capable of producing
the required amount of homogeneous high-strength yarn, since mule-jennies
and hand-spindles were unable to do so.
89 Power-loom weaving ﬁrms could not
know ex ante this quality of the yarn. In effect, the frequency of breakdowns was
the only available indicator of whether yarn met the strength requirements.
Moreover, the marginal value of this high-strength yarn was nothing for hand-
loom weavers, since they could employ all types of yarn without additional
86 Williamson, Markets; Mowery, ‘Finance’.
87 Graell, Informació pública.
88 Spanish contemporary technical handbooks refer to these problems with the self-acting mule and the
advantages of maintaining the use of mule-jennies. See, for example, Arau, Tratado completo. However, the
self-acting mule was more ﬂexible than the throstle, as the latter efﬁciently produced only a very limited range of
counts in larger series. See also vonTunzelmann,Steam power, and Lyons,‘Powerloom proﬁtability’, pp. 398–400.
89 Von Tunzelmann, Steam power, and Lyons, ‘Powerloom proﬁtability’.
17costs.
90 Consequently, theory predicts that ﬁrms employing self-acting mules
or/and power-looms (modern machinery) tend to integrate vertically cotton
spinning and weaving more frequently than ﬁrms employing mule-jennies or
handlooms.
These arguments can be formalized into the following pair of equations:
Vertical integration PROB
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Equation (1) can be estimated by a logit and logistic regression (the dependent
variable takes the value 1 if vertical integration is positive).
91 In equation (2),
because the dependent variable is limited between 0 (market transaction) and 1
(self-sufﬁciency), this model should be estimated using a Tobit regression.
92
Table 6 presents a variety of estimation results that are broadly consistent with
each other, suggesting that the results are robust to regression speciﬁcation.The
explanatory variables worked reasonably well. All of the coefﬁcients are of the
expected sign and signiﬁcant on nearly all occasions. More importantly, the odds
ratios of the concentration variable are very high (above four).
94 However, some
differences between the different estimations are noteworthy. In particular, the
different speciﬁcations provide a better explanation of vertical integration in cotton
weaving than in the spinning sector.This is mainly due to the high signiﬁcance of
the variable‘machinery’in cotton weaving,indicating that physical asset speciﬁcity
was very important in the case of the adoption of power-looms. It is likely,
90 This problem could have been solved if Catalan weaving ﬁrms had established long-term contracts with their
yarn suppliers, or a system of reputation based on trademarks. However, during this period, the ﬁrms survived for
short periods (typically ﬁve years or less) and contracts were hard to enforce, given the well-known inefﬁciency
of the Spanish legal system. Moreover, Spanish patent law did not protect trademarks and quality improvements
from imitations.
91 Logistic is identical to logit regression, but it calculates odds ratios instead of coefﬁcients (sometimes called
logits in this type of regression). The logit can be easily converted into an odds ratio s i m p l yb yu s i n gt h e
exponential function (raising the natural log e to the b1 power). Note that an odds ratio above 1.0 means that the
odds of getting ‘1’ on a dependent dichotomous variable are greater for the given category.
92 However, with these different methods of regression, one cannot control the unobservable heterogeneity
(González-Díaz, Arruñada, and Fernández, ‘Causes of subcontracting’). If one assumes that this unobservable
heterogeneity is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component, this can be addressed by using panel data techniques, given that
observations are available for two different periods (1850 and 1861). Following the standard procedure described
in Greene, Econometric analysis, pp. 479–80, one has two alternative models: ﬁxed and random effects. If
individual effects and regressors are correlated, the choice should be a ﬁxed-effects model. On the other hand, if
regressors and individual effects are orthogonal, one should employ the random-effects model. The Hausman
(‘Speciﬁcation tests’) test shows that the random-effect model is more efﬁcient than the ﬁxed-effects model, but
the two models do not differ systematically. In this case, the standard solution is to investigate the correlation
between individual effects and regressors directly.The results obtained in these tests lead us to accept the null
hypothesis of non-correlation in all the models estimated, at any signiﬁcance level. Hence, the choice has been to
estimate random-effects models. Unfortunately, results (not presented here, but available from the author) were
practically identical to those obtained with standard techniques, perhaps due to the fact that the maximum
number of observations for each ﬁrm is small (two).
94 Alternative speciﬁcations combining both spinning and weaving panels and employing interaction terms have
also been tested without signiﬁcantly different results (all estimations are available upon request).
18therefore, that vertical integration advanced as a backward integration of power-
loom weaving into mechanical spinning.
It is also interesting to explore whether the integration behaviour of recently
established cotton ﬁrms differed from that of established ﬁrms.The period of entry
was 11 years (from 1850 to 1861). Table 7 presents the results of an analysis of the
probability of integration and the extent of internal markets separately for ﬁrms
that were new in the sample year of 1861 and for established ﬁrms that had been
operating in the previous sample year.
95 The models are the same as those esti-
mated in table 6 and were estimated only for ﬁrms operating in 1861. It is
93 Alternative measures of concentration were also tested, such as the total amount of production capacity of
the district, the total production capacity of yarn or cloth, and the concentration ratio of the upward (backward)
sector, without signiﬁcantly different results in the regressions. All of these alternative estimations are available
upon request from the author.
95 Ohanian (‘Vertical integration’, p. 206) suggests this test.
Table 6. Determinants of vertical integration in cotton spinning and weaving
Dependent variable
Method



























Log likelihood -368.88 -368.88 -425.53
Chi
2 40.79 40.79 88.72
Pseudo R
2 0.05 0.05 0.09






























Log likelihood -332.26 -332.26 -463.57
Chi
2 406.38 406.38 335.36
Pseudo R
2 0.38 0.38 0.27
Observations 1,416 1,416 1,416
Notes: a signiﬁcant at 0.01 level; b signiﬁcant at 0.05 level; c signiﬁcant at 0.1 level; d not signiﬁcant.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All explanatory variables are in logs.Yearly dummies are included in all regressions. The
concentration variable is a geometric average of the concentration ratios in the cotton spinning sector and cotton weaving in a
given district.This follows Caves and Bradburd (‘Empirical determinants’, pp. 269–70), who recommend estimating joint seller
and buyer market concentration in each market. These concentration ratios are obtained as the ratio between the (estimated)
production capacity of the largest four ﬁrms of that district and the total (estimated) production capacity of that district.93 In panel
A, size is measured as the production capacity in tons of yarn per year and modern machinery is measured as the ratio of the
estimated production of yarn made by steam and water-powered machinery to the total estimated production of yarn. In panel
B, size is measured as the production capacity in tons of cloth per year and modern machinery is measured as the ratio of the
estimated production of cloth made by power looms to the total estimated production of cloth.
Sources: See tab. 1.
19remarkable that the test in both logit andTobit estimations suggests that there are
no signiﬁcant differences between new and established ﬁrms.
96 This implies that
even established ﬁrms were reactive to changes in market circumstances, particu-
larly the increase in levels of concentration.
IV
The objective of this section is to apply the intuitions behind the model outlined
above to other phases in the production and distribution of cotton textiles. More
speciﬁcally, it will speculate about the relevance of the independent variables
(concentration, size, and modern machinery) in explaining the limited scope of
vertical integration in cotton printing, raw cotton markets, and ﬁnished cloth
markets.
Why was vertical integration so limited in cotton printing? Interestingly, cotton
printing ﬁrms in Catalonia shared several characteristics with vertically integrated
ﬁrms in cotton spinning and weaving, but there were also signiﬁcant differences.
96 The method for comparing logit coefﬁcients across groups was developed by Allison, ‘Comparing logit and
probit’. There are two strategies. The ﬁrst strategy is to separate the sample into subgroups, then perform an
otherwise identical logistic regression for each. One then computes the p value for aWald chi-square test of the
signiﬁcance of the differences between the corresponding coefﬁcients.The second strategy is to create an indicator
(dummy) variable or set of variables which reﬂects membership/non-membership in the group and also to have
interaction terms between the indicator dummies and other independent variables, so that the signiﬁcant
interactions are interpreted as indicating signiﬁcant differences across groups for the corresponding independent
variables.When an indicator variable has been entered as a set of dummy variables, its interaction with another
variable will involve multiple interaction terms. In this case, the signiﬁcance of the interaction of the indicator
variable and another independent variable is the signiﬁcance of the change of R-square of the equation with the
interaction terms and the equation without the set of terms associated with the ordinal variable.These two tests
served to reject clearly the existence of cross-group differences. However, it should be noted that Allison’s test is
conservative, in that it will always yield a chi-square which is smaller than the conventional test, making it harder
to prove the existence of cross-group differences.












































Log likelihood 277.2565 389.8194 60.7414 91.4793
Chi
2 169.26 161.66 46.91 47.30
Pseudo R
2 0.2290 0.1717 0.2625 0.2054
Observations 637 637 140 140
Notes: a signiﬁcant at 0.01 level; b signiﬁcant at 0.05 level; c signiﬁcant at 0.1 level; d not signiﬁcant. Standard errors are in
brackets.All estimations comprise observations in cotton spinning and weaving (sector dummies are included in the regressions).
The dependent variable in logit estimations is Vertical integration = 1, 0 otherwise.The dependent variable in Tobit regressions
is Cloth (yarn) production/Yarn (cloth) production.
Sources: See tab. 1.
20Size and the production of longer series were characteristics shared by cotton
printing and vertically integrated cotton spinning and weaving ﬁrms.The average
production capacity of cotton printing ﬁrms was 131 tons in 1850 and 223 tons in
1861; that is, several times the average capacity of cotton spinning and weaving
ﬁrms. Moreover, the 10 largest cotton printing ﬁrms had a greater production
capacity (measured in tons) than the 10 largest cotton spinning or weaving ﬁrms.
Consequently, at ﬁrst sight, size may justify the costs of internal organization and
make backward vertical integration of cotton printing ﬁrms into cotton weaving
desirable. However, the extent of vertical integration among these largest cotton
printing ﬁrms was limited; so, in 1861, only three of 10 ﬁrms vertically integrated
cotton printing with cotton weaving.
97 Moreover, as in cotton spinning and
weaving, modern printing ﬁrms produced longer series of each type of cloth than
traditional ﬁrms; therefore, apparently, they could suffer from dedicated assets
problems.
However, printing ﬁrms also differed signiﬁcantly in other ways. Firstly, they did
not suffer the physical asset problems of power-loom weaving ﬁrms, since modern
printing machinery could use any kind of cotton cloth regardless of quality, which
was easily measured by any expert.
98 Secondly, in spite of the fact that the overall
(region-wide) concentration of the cotton printing phase was the highest,
99 the
concentration level of the ﬁrms by district was relatively low. Catalan cotton
printing ﬁrms were concentrated in only two locations: the majority of ﬁrms were
located in Barcelona (particularly in the borough of Sant Martí de Provençals) and
the rest in the Anoia cotton district (mainly in the town of Igualada).
100 In other
words, weaving ﬁrms did not experience small-numbers bargaining problems
when selling their grey cloth to printing ﬁrms or when subcontracting printing
processes. Moreover, given the structure of the distribution of cloth in Catalonia,
printing ﬁrms did not suffer from this kind of problem either. Cotton cloth was
produced elsewhere in Catalonia, but was normally transported to Barcelona for
distribution, and most cotton-weaving ﬁrms had a storehouse in the city. In other
words, the supply of grey cloth in Barcelona was continuous, far exceeding the
production capacity of the city and its surroundings. In summary, the preponder-
ance of specialized ﬁrms in cotton printing can be explained by appealing to the
lack of importance of asset speciﬁcity in printing production.
101
It is remarkable to note that similar arguments can be used to explain the low
levels of backward integration of cotton ﬁrms into the supply of raw cotton and
forward integration into the distribution of ﬁnished cloth. In the ﬁrst case, the
quality of raw cotton could be recognized easily by any expert, since it depended
on the physical, observable characteristics of the ﬁbre. Moreover, in Barcelona
there were many wholesale merchants capable of maintaining a continuous ﬂow of
raw cotton at competitive prices. For example, the largest individual consumer of
raw cotton in Catalonia, the España Industrial SA, chartered ships to transport
97 Similarly, of the 10 largest cotton-weaving ﬁrms, only three integrated forward into cotton printing.
98 Comisión Especial Arancelaria, Información.
99 This was mainly due to the fact that the number of ﬁrms was much smaller than in the other phases.
100 For example, by 1850, 49 of 57 printing ﬁrms were located in the district of Barcelona, and in 1861 this
proportion grew, since 37 of 42 were located there.
101 It should be noted that regressions similar to those in tab. 5 employing cotton-ﬁnishing data have been
estimated without any signiﬁcant result.
21raw cotton from New Orleans in the late 1850s, but quickly decided to give up this
practice as no savings at all were made.
102
In the case of ﬁnished fabrics marketing, a large number of wholesalers, mer-
chants, and agents who traded with cotton goods were also located in Barcelona.
Commonly, these merchants were responsible for all the distribution of Catalan
cloth throughout Spain, although they sometimes received credit from cotton
industry ﬁrms.Therefore, it was relatively easy for any cotton ﬁrm to change to a
different merchant; in other words, the small-number bargaining problem was of
little importance in the distribution of ﬁnished cloth. More signiﬁcantly, it was
common for the largest ﬁrms in the cotton industry to trade with a large number
of merchant-houses (sometimes more than 50).
103
V
This article offers new insights into the causes of vertical integration and subcon-
tracting in the Spanish cotton industry by applying some of the arguments of
transaction cost theory. The use of vertical integration was more widespread in
yarn markets characterized by relatively high buyer and seller concentration.
Larger cotton spinning and weaving ﬁrms and those employing the most recent
technology (self-acting mules and power-looms) were also more likely to integrate
vertically because of physical and dedicated assets problems. Subcontracting,
however,predominated in phases such as cotton printing and the marketing of raw
cotton and ﬁnished cotton goods, where small-numbers bargaining problems were
minor and where asset speciﬁcity problems were less important. Consequently,
vertical integration was not the result of any general characteristic of the Spanish
market for cotton goods, but of some speciﬁc characteristics of the intermediate
markets for yarn.
104
These results suggest some sort of evolutionary interpretation of the changes in
the market structure of the cotton industry in Catalonia over the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, in accordance with the life-cycle theory advanced by Sti-
gler.
105 However, the evidence also indicates that the evolution of the structure of
the industry was shaped by forces other than asset speciﬁcity. Particularly relevant
is the role of the institutional and legal framework during the earlier development
of the industry.
In the early days of the industry, asThompson has argued, the predominance of
vertical integration into weaving and marketing among calico printing concerns
was probably caused by the particular institutional framework which emerged
from local traditions and the subsequent regulation introduced by the Bourbon
governments.
106The absolute dominance of the guild system in Barcelona, which
limited the extent of the market, had made the organization of the weaving
industry on a putting-out basis virtually impossible in these early years.Therefore,
102 See Castañeda and Tafunell, ‘Mercado mayorista’, on this market.
103 See Prat and Soler, ‘Formación de redes comerciales’.
104 Note that this result contradicts previous research (Maluquer, ‘Estructura’) which stressed that, given the
characteristics of the Spanish home market (small and unstable), the only choice for Catalan cotton ﬁrms was
subcontracting.
105 Stigler, ‘Division of labor’.
106 Thompson, Distinctive industrialisation.
22there were not enough independent handloom weavers and merchants to satisfy
the buyer and seller necessities of the relatively large printing concerns. Moreover,
government mercantilist regulations forced calico printing concerns to integrate
into spinning and weaving. In 1767, the same industry adopted regulations in
order to protect this type of industrial structure based on relatively large calico
printing concerns which were vertically integrated into spinning and weaving.
The reliance of cotton ﬁrms on vertical integration decreased from the 1790s
onwards.It is likely that this change was caused by the interaction of several forces.
Firstly, the changing political circumstances eroded the power of guilds and the
previous set of regulations. Secondly, the industry grew enough to maintain
specialized ﬁrms in both cotton weaving and printing. Thirdly, the new cotton
spinning industry was vertically specialized because it was made up of relatively
small units of production. Fourthly, cotton industry machinery made production
in small batches (to order) possible. In other words, asset speciﬁcity problems
(particularly physical assets and dedicated assets) appear to have been minor
during this period. Finally, given the high levels of uncertainty and the low levels
of asset speciﬁcity, vertical specialization was efﬁcient at coping with the unstable
demand given the low contracting costs.
107
The situation changed dramatically with the arrival of the factory system and the
new self-acting mules, throstles, and power-looms.These new technologies were
less ﬂexible than the older machinery and produced longer series of each type of
yarn and cloth; thus, cotton mills grew in size and put pressure on local markets
for yarn. For this reason, dedicated, physical, and site speciﬁcity problems arose,
and new entrants to the ﬁeld of cotton spinning and weaving decided to integrate
these two consecutive phases vertically.It is likely that this situation continued over
the rest of the century, given that the average mean size of cotton mills grew and
the industry continued to survive in many locations, due to the increase in the
number of water mills.
108
How do these results for Spain compare with previous studies for other coun-
tries? It is clear that the Spanish experience has some important similarities with
the experiences of other countries, and this research may serve to throw light on
some hitherto unclear issues. Previous studies of the cotton industries in Lancash-
ire, the United States, and Germany have found that size, product type (coarse
goods), and location were major determinants of the vertical integration of cotton
107 The literature on transaction costs argues that uncertainty is relevant for vertical integration if a certain
degree of asset speciﬁcity exists. If a transaction does not require speciﬁc investments, contracting costs are small
and a new agreement could be reached easily in any new situation. Instead, when asset speciﬁcity exists,
uncertainty increases the cost of establishing how the participants should act in each possible contingency and
makes the existence of unforeseen hold-up problems possible. On this point, see, for example, Williamson,
Economic institutions, pp. 56–60.
108 Unfortunately, the quality of cotton industry statistics decreased sharply after the cotton famine, although
qualitative evidence on the abundance of vertically integrated ﬁrms during the second half of the nineteenth
century is abundant (see, for example, Nadal, ‘Indústria cotonera’, pp. 48–57). Moreover, the accounts for the
early twentieth century show the preponderance of vertically integrated mills in Catalonia. For example, Odell
(Cotton goods,p.17),in his study for the industry in 1911,pointed out:‘The (Catalan cotton) industry is modelled
after that of the United States, spinning, weaving and ﬁnishing being carried on in each mill. In addition, many
of the plants maintain complete bleaching and printing departments which enable them to furnish the ﬁnished
product to the trade.’ Similarly, the survey conducted in 1929 by the comité regulador de la industria algodonera
(Regulatory Committee of the Cotton Industry). (Beltrán, Industria algodonera, p. 158) found that 58% of
spinning ﬁrms were integrated into weaving.
23spinning and weaving.
109 It appears that the greater tendency of bigger spinning
and weaving ﬁrms to vertically integrate, compared to smaller ﬁrms, is a universal
pattern.
Product type is directly related to the choice of machinery, given that the
self-acting mules and the power-looms were better suited to the production of
coarser than ﬁner goods.
110 Consequently, the variable machinery of this study can
be considered practically equivalent to the variable quality of previous studies. In
other words, it would also appear that certain types of machinery which were
employed to produce coarse goods paved the way to vertical integration, given
their asset speciﬁcity problems.
In spite of the fact that all of these studies have considered the relative impor-
tance of location variables, they have rarely linked this relevance to the presence of
small-number bargaining problems.
111 This article offers a straightforward expla-
nation for the relevance of location in the choice between vertical integration and
market governance. Districts with high concentration ratios suffered from small-
numbers bargaining problems and, hence, had a large share of vertically integrated
ﬁrms.This argument could be used to explain why the English cotton industry was
vertically specialized and the US and German cotton industries were vertically
integrated. In Lancashire, the concentration of cotton ﬁrms of different phases in
a short distance was extraordinary. In contrast, cotton ﬁrms in Spain, the United
States, and Germany were typically spread out or even isolated from other ﬁrms.
Consequently, it is not surprising that they suffered from small-numbers bargain-
ing problems and faced large transaction and transport costs when changing
supplier or buyer. Finally, at least in Catalonia, there was no direct correlation
between shop-ﬂoor organization and business organization. More speciﬁcally,
vertically integrated ﬁrms (and horizontally specialized ﬁrms) could employ the
two major types of labour management practices: foremanship and internal sub-
contracting. It seems that the kind of job and workforce skills, rather than the type
of ﬁrm, were the major determinants of workforce organization.
To conclude, I would like to highlight three broad suggestions for further
research. Firstly, the evidence collected here indicates the importance of high
concentration ratios and the subsequent small-numbers bargaining problems in
ﬁrms’ choices regarding vertical integration. Consequently, it would be desirable
to extend the evidence on market concentration to cotton industries in other
countries. Secondly, the article’s ﬁndings suggest the need to rethink the relation-
ship between vertical integration and international competitiveness. In line with
Brown’s study of the situation in Germany, the results obtained here support the
view that there was no close connection between vertical integration and success-
109 Huberman, ‘Vertical disintegration’; Temin, ‘Product quality’; Brown, ‘Market organization’.
110 Obviously, the choice of quality is also related to the characteristics of markets. In the case of Spain, the
highly protected cotton industry produced goods for domestic consumers who were relatively poor and preferred
cheap and durable cotton goods; that is, relatively heavy cloth. However, in the case of Spain (in sharp contrast
with the US experience; see Scranton, Proprietary capitalism, pp. 44ff.) the characteristics of local markets did not
determine the pattern of specialization. For example, without discernible differences in consumer demand, the
city of Reus specialized mainly in ﬁne goods,whereas the city ofVilanova specialized in heavy goods.In Barcelona,
all types of cotton textiles were produced.
111 Leunig’s article (‘New answers’) on the Lancashire cotton industry during the early twentieth century
provides a notable exception to this rule. He argues that spinning ﬁrms did not suffer hold-ups because, given the
high spatial concentration of the industry, there was enough upstream competition.
24fulness in international markets for cotton goods.
112Thirdly, this article has shown
the explanatory power, and some limitations, of the transaction cost theory in
economic and business history. In a dynamic framework, factors such as demand,
traditions, institutions, and legal framework, as well as asset speciﬁcity, appear to
be relevant in shaping business structures. Consequently, a historically sounded
explanation for vertical integration should take into account all of these dynamic
factors, not just the static properties of business transactions that are analysed by
transaction cost theory.
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATING THE PRODUCTION CAPACITY
OF COTTON FIRMS
The sources for this article are the two major surveys carried out during the period
for the Catalan cotton industry. The survey of 1850 (Junta de Fabricas de
Cataluña, Censo de fabricas de 1850, Arxiu del Foment del Treball Nacional,
Barcelona) is divided into three parts: the ﬁrst focusing on cotton spinning
establishments, the second on cotton and mixed-fabric weaving establishments,
and the third on printing establishments.The survey appears to include establish-
ments located in all parts of Catalonia.For each category,the survey lists the name
of the ﬁrm, the location of the establishment, the amount and type of machinery
in use, and number of workers.The industrial guide for 1861 (Gimenez Guited,
Guia fabril) collected data on all cotton ﬁrms located in Catalonia. It seems that
the original data were drawn from records of industrial taxes and were similar to
the information collected in the previous survey. However, unlike the census for
1850, this survey did not separate workers from the different phases since it
aggregated them by establishment and ﬁrm.
These two surveys did not record data regarding the actual production of each
ﬁrm. However, given that different types of spindles and looms produced different
amounts of product per year, the production capacity in tons per year of each ﬁrm
can be derived from the machinery ﬁgures. According to the sources, the average
production capacity of the different types of spindles were as follows: 3 kg per year
for hand-spindles; 11 kg per year for mule-jennies powered by horses; 15 kg per
year for throstles; 20 kg per year for steam- or water-powered mule-jennies; and
23 kg per year for self-acting mules. Similarly, the average production capacity of
hand-looms was 280 kg per year and that of power-looms was 1,400 kg per year.
The sources of these ﬁgures are Sayró, Industria algodonera, Figuerola, Estadística,
and Comisión Especial Arancelaria, Información, vol. IV, pp. 43–54.
Using estimated production ﬁgures, the coverage of the sample can be com-
puted by dividing the corresponding values (collected in tab. 1) by the amount of
yarn and cloth production in Rosés (‘Industrialización regional’, pp. 74–5).Thus,
27in 1850 the coverage of cotton spinning was 99.77 per cent, and of cotton weaving
93.89 per cent; in 1861 the ﬁgure for cotton spinning was 94.75 per cent, and
95.74 per cent for cotton weaving.
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the variables
1850 1861
Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD
Panel A: spinning
Dep. var. 314 0.2812 0.4502 256 0.4179 0.4941
Concentration 314 3.3181 0.2208 256 3.7075 0.2207
Size 314 9.5691 1.5205 256 10.4125 1.1132
Mod. mach. 314 2.7795 2.2620 256 4.6152 0.0000
Panel B: weaving
Dep. var. 976 0.0719 0.2584 518 0.2146 0.4109
Concentration 976 3.3299 0.3061 518 3.6952 0.1719
Size 976 8.4513 1.1255 518 9.1201 1.2771
Mod. mach. 976 0.2216 0.9817 518 0.9516 1.8652
Notes: All explanatory variables in logs. Due to the presence of zeros, the variable modern machinery has been computed as log
(1 + modern machinery). See tab. 1.
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